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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court held in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch that the review
of administrators’ decisions to deny benefits under ERISA-qualified plans must be
accorded a non-deferential, de novo standard of review. But what about top-hat
plans? A top-hat plan is a type of nonqualified deferred compensation plan designed
to avoid key ERISA provisions, including ERISA’s fiduciary provisions. In the decades since Firestone, this question has remained unanswered. What has occurred is
a rift among the appellate courts, centered around a split between the Third and
Seventh Circuits. This article addresses the dilemma and advocates for the implementation of the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard over de novo review.
The following analysis employs original observations drawn from the cases, such
as the overlap of the administrator and fiduciary positions, in constructing an argument centered around the theme of the mootness and irrelevance of de novo review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The field of corporate governance is composed of a vast array of issues concerned with balancing the interests of company shareholders, senior management
executives, customers, suppliers, financiers, the government, and the community. 1
One of the core sub-disciplines of corporate governance pertains to the compensation of executives.2
Executive compensation differs from the pay packages given to non-executive
workers in that executive pay is oriented toward rewards for actual results. 3 If a
company underperforms, executive pay will suffer.4 Or, if the company meets its
annual objectives and the stock price responds long term, the executives stand to
receive a larger payout.5
Perhaps the most important statute relating to executive compensation is the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). 6 ERISA is primarily codified in Title 26 and Title 29 of the United States Code. 7 The purpose of
ERISA is to set minimum standards for most voluntarily-established retirement
plans in private industry and to provide protection for those enrolled. 8 ERISA applies to both rank-and-file workers as well as executives at the top of the corporate
hierarchy.9
ERISA packs a multitude of implications for the realm of executive compensation. One such set of implications concerns the fiduciary responsibilities of those
who manage and control plan assets.10 Plan administrators and fiduciaries are each
defined differently under ERISA.11 The plan administrator is simply the person or

1. James Chen, Corporate Governance Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporategovernance.asp (last updated February 23, 2021).
2. See id.
3. What is Executive Compensation, CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, https://execcomp.org/Basics/Basic/What-Is-Executive-Compensation (last visited March 31, 2020).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. ERISA provides “a uniform regulatory scheme over employee benefit plans,” including “expansive pre-emption provisions, see ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, [29 USCS § 1144] which are intended
to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be ‘exclusively a federal concern.’” Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten Inc., 451 U.S. 504,
523 (1981)). Indeed, almost all private employers are subject to ERISA compliance, and are faced with
severe penalties if they fail to comply. The Importance of ERISA Compliance to Employee Benefit Plans,
STERLING INSURANCE GROUP BLOG (Feb. 15, 2019), https://sterlingagency.com/resources/blog/erisa/.
“[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement
remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.” Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209.
7. ERISA: Research Guide to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI
LIBRARIES, https://guides.libraries.uc.edu/c.php?g=222726&p=1473321 (last updated Aug. 21, 2020
9:12AM).
8. See ERISA, U.S. DEPT. LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/erisa (last visited
March 31, 2020) (“In general, ERISA does not cover group health plans established or maintained by
governmental entities, churches for their employees, or plans which are maintained solely to comply
with applicable workers compensation, unemployment, or disability laws.”).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2019) (“The term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an
employer.”) (emphasis added).
10. See e.g. 29 U.S.C. §1002(37); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (defining the term administrator); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(defining the term fiduciary).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol5/iss1/4

2

Taddeo: Form Over Function: The Case for Employing the Arbitrary and Capr

No. 1]

Taddeo: Form Over Function

3

entity in charge of managing the plan.12 Fiduciaries, which may include plan administrators, have the specific duty to run plans with the best interest of the plan
participants and beneficiaries in mind.13 Importantly, a fiduciary must avoid conflicts of interest.14
A conflict of interest occurs where the denial of a benefits claim has the potential to benefit the one making the decision.15 A conflict is inherent when an administrator plays the dual role of determining who is eligible for plan benefits and paying those benefits out of its own pocket.16 The particular scenario with which this
article is concerned arises from a denial of benefits under an unfunded, ERISAcovered plan in which the employer acts as both the administrator and fiduciary. 17
As a fiduciary, the employer must act in the participant’s best interest, yet, as the
employer, it is also confronted by its own desire to minimize its expenditures.18
Typically, a reviewing court would be expected to employ the deferential arbitrary
and capricious standard when reviewing denials of benefits by ERISA fiduciaries
and administrators. After all, such individuals would presumptively be operating in
the best interests of plan participants. Should such a standard continue to be applied
where the fiduciaries and administrators have an adverse interest?
This was the question confronted by the Supreme Court in the seminal case of
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.19 In answer, the Court established a nondeferential de novo standard of review for denials of benefits under ERISAsupervised, unfunded plans unless the administrator has the fiduciary authority to
determine plan benefits.20 However, the holding left a kink in the system. The Supreme Court did not define a set standard for the administrators of top-hat plans, a
special type of executive compensation plan designed to avoid key provisions of
ERISA.21 In Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, the Third Circuit decided upon a de
novo standard, since top-hat plan administrators are not subject to ERISA fiduciary
rules.22 Ten years later, the Seventh Circuit in Comrie v. IPSCO decided upon the
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard if the plan administrator possesses the
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A); Plan Information, U.S. DEPT. LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/planinformation (last visited February 7, 2021) (describing plan administrators as
“the people who run plans”).
13. Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEPT. LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/fiduciaryresp (last visited January 21, 2021) (“The primary responsibility of fiduciaries is to run the plan
solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits
and paying plan expenses.”).
14. See id. (“[Fiduciaries] may not engage in transactions on behalf of the plan that benefit parties
related to the plan, such as other fiduciaries, services providers, or the plan sponsor.”).
15. Sally Lerner Galati, The ERISA Hokey-Pokey: You Put Your Top Hat In, You Put Your Top Hat
Out, 5 NEV. L.J. 587, 595 (2004).
16. Shepherd v. Community First Bank, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52475 at *44 (D. S.C. 2019) (quoting
Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008)).
17. A plan is unfunded when its benefits are paid directly to the employee by the employer out of the
employer’s own general corporate funds. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 138
(3rd Cir. 1987) aff’d in part, rev’d in part., 489 U.S. 101, 107 (1989).
18. See, e.g., Metro Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 112.
19. 489 U.S. 101, 107 (1989) (“With respect to Count I, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that most
federal courts have reviewed the denial of benefits by ERISA fiduciaries and administrators under the
arbitrary and capricious standard. [Bruch, 828 F.2d at 138] (citing cases). It noted, however, that the
arbitrary and capricious standard had been softened in cases where fiduciaries and administrators had
some bias or adverse interest. [Bruch, 828 F.2d] at 138-140.”).
20. See id. at 115.
21. See infra Section II(A) for the definition and discussion of top-hat plans.
22. See 251 F.3d 433, 436 (3rd Cir. 2001).
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requisite discretion under Firestone.23 The split over the issue remains, reinforced
by additional cases from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. 24
This article will argue that courts should review all top-hat claim denials under
the arbitrary and capricious standard. Section II will provide the pertinent background information. It will define and discuss top-hat plans and their features. It
will then discuss the Firestone case, as well as the Goldstein and Comrie cases
which form the core of the split. Section III will define and examine the two standards of review at issue: arbitrary and capricious review and de novo review. Section
III will also discuss relevant features of both plans and why the deferential standard
is more appropriate. Section IV will discuss why the fiduciary status of top-hat plan
administrators is irrelevant and argue that administrators are entitled to a deferential
standard of review regardless of their status. Lastly, Section V will address the confusion and unnecessary labor that results from employing non-deferential review to
top-hat plans. This discussion will be made primarily through an example involving
excess-benefit plans, a relative of the top-hat plan.

II. TOP-HAT PLANS FROM THE BOTTOM UP
A. What is a Top-Hat Plan?
“A top-hat plan is a form of nonqualified deferred compensation plan that is
established to provide unfunded . . . deferred compensation benefits only to a select
group of management or highly compensated employees.”25 Designed to avoid key
provisions of ERISA, top-hat plans are excluded from ERISA’s vesting, funding,
and fiduciary responsibility requirements.26 They are subject to ERISA’s reporting
and disclosure provisions, and administration and enforcement requirements. 27
Top-hat plans are designed for high-ranking executives and corporate directors.28 In fact, to come within the purview of the top-hat provision, a plan must be

23. See 636 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2011).
24. See Sznewajs v. U.S. Bancorp Amended and Restated Supplemental Benefits Plan, 572 F.3d 727
(9th Cir. 2009) (supporting a deferential standard); Craig v. Pillsbury Non-Qualified Pension Plan, 458
F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 06) (supporting non-deferential review).
25. Top Hat Plans, AFFINITY WEALTH ADVISORS (Jan. 28, 2012), https://www.2affinity.com/top-hatplans/ [hereinafter AFFINITY WEALTH ADVISORS].
26. See id. (listing the avoidance of certain ERISA requirements as a reason why one would seek to
establish a top-hat plan); see also 29 USCS § 1051(2) (2018); 29 USCS § 1081(a)(3) (2018); 29 USCS
1101(a)(1) (2018).
27. See Senior Exec. Benefit Plan Participants v. New Valley Corp. (In re New Valley Corp.), 89 F.3d
143, 148-49 (3rd Cir. 1996) (“The dominant characteristic of the special top hat regime is the nearcomplete exemption of top hat plans from ERISA’s substantive requirements. Section 1051(2) exempts
top hat plans from ERISA’s minimum participation standards, minimum vesting standards, and various
other content requirements. Section 1081(a)(3) exempts top hat plans from ERISA’s minimum funding
requirements. Section 1101(a)(1) exempts top hat plans from ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility provisions, including the requirement of a written plan, the need to give control of plan funds to a trustee, the
imposition of liability on fiduciaries, and limitations on transactions and investments. Section 1051(2)
exempts top hat plans from ERISA’s reporting and disclosure requirements upon promulgation of the
proper administrative regulations.”); see also Lerner Galati, supra note 15 at 598-612.
28. Julia Kagan, Top Hat Plan, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/top-hatplan.asp (last updated February 21, 2021); see also Non-Governmental 457(b) Deferred Compensation
Plans, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/non-governmental-457b-deferred-compensationplans (last updated Apr. 16, 2020) (“Non-governmental 457(b) (‘Top Hat’) plans must limit participation
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maintained “primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation to a select group of management or highly compensated employees.” 29 This category of
individuals is considered a “top-hat” group, which is how this type of plan received
its name.30 The policy behind top-hat plans comes from the belief that upper-echelon employees can fend for themselves, as they are capable of protecting their own
pension interests unlike those on the lower rungs of the corporate ladder.31
Top-hat plans benefit those whose “annual compensation exceeds the limit for
compensation that can be taken into account under a qualified retirement plan.” 32
Because top-hat plans are exempt from most of the strict requirements imposed by
ERISA, they enjoy a wide degree of flexibility in regard to which employees they
benefit, the amount of benefits, and when employees are entitled to benefits. 33
Top-hat plans are attractive because of the potentially massive savings they
entail for participants.34 Executives in higher tax brackets are able to defer income
until retirement, when they are likely to be in a lower bracket. 35 Corporations use
this benefit to recruit competitive employees and provide an incentive for executives to remain at the company.36
In addition to recruiting qualified executives, top-hat plans carry further implications for corporate governance. Top-hat type plans are discriminatory by nature,
benefiting the corporate elite, and can thus be seen as being unfriendly toward shareholders.37 The proxy statement of PepsiCo, for example, touts the company’s lack
of supplemental retirement plans or excessive perks for its executive officers.38 This
could be seen as encouraging companies instituting top-hat plans to expand the
group of those eligible for the plans. However, companies instituting top-hat plans
to groups of highly compensated employees or groups of executives, managers, directors or officers. The
plan may not cover rank-and-file employees.”)
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2); see also Alexander v. Brigham & Women’s Physicians Org., Inc., 513 F.3d.
37, 46 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 879 F. Supp. 802, 816 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (“To
come within the compass of the top-hat provision, the employer must be able to show a substantial
disparity between the compensation paid to members of the top-hat group and the compensation paid to
all other workers.”).
30. See “Top Hat” Plans – What Are They and How Do You Know If You Have One, FULCRUM
PARTNERS, LLC, https://www.fulcrumpartnersllc.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Top-Hat-Plans1.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2020) [hereinafter FULCRUM PARTNERS].
31. See Alexander, 513 F.3d. at 43 (citing Gallione v. Flaherty, 70 F.3d 724, 727 (2nd Cir. 1995).
32. Lori Jones, A Top Hat Plan Checklist for Employers, THOMPSON COBURN (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/publications/item/2018-11-07/a-top-hat-plan-checklist-foremployers. At the time of Jones’ article, the 401(a) compensation limit was $275,000. In 2020, that limit
was $285,000, and increased to $290,000 in 2021. See 401(k) Plans – Deferrals and Matching When
Compensation Exceeds the Annual Limit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/401k-plans-deferrals-and-matching-when-compensation-exceeds-the-annual-limit#:~:text=The%20annual%20limits%20are%3A (last updated Nov. 12, 2020).
33. See AFFINITY WEALTH ADVISORS, supra note 25.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. See Weedman v. Sander Mfg. Co., 2017 Tenn. Bus. LEXIS 9, at *4 (Davidson Cty. Chanc. Ct.
2017). This case featured a lawsuit brought by five minority shareholders against a corporate resolution
authorizing the board of directors to review, approve, and execute documents paying $896,000 to fund
the corporation’s top-hat plan. Plaintiffs alleged the resolution was in contrast to cuts in the 401K plan,
effectively eliminating a retirement plan for everyone but the top-hat participants.
38. See Creating More Smiles with Every Sip and Every Bite, PEPSICO 9, https://www.pepsico.com/docs/album/annual-reports/pepsico-inc-2020-proxy-statement.pdf (“Our executive compensation program avoids shareholder-unfriendly features. For our executive officers, we do not have employment agreements, supplemental retirement plans or excessive perks… .”) (last visited April 6, 2020).
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must walk a fine line as to not include individuals who a government agency or
court may determine to be outside of the eligible group.39 Likewise, instituting companies should be careful as to not make the “select group” of employees eligible for
the top-hat plan not so select.40
Not subject to the funding or fiduciary responsibilities required by ERISA, tophat plan administrators are not fiduciaries and therefore not required to make any
decisions in the participant’s best interest. 41 ERISA itself exempts top-hat plan administrators from fiduciary status.42 There is also no cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty in top-hat plans.43 The theory behind the lack of fiduciary status is
that the executives covered by top-hat plans do not need the protection of ERISA
that would be accorded to rank and file employees.44
Top-hat plans avoidance of key ERISA requirements puts them in conflict with
the trust-based reasoning behind the administration of benefit plans intended to be
addressed by Firestone. This conflict is what is being confronted by the courts, reconciling Firestone’s trust-based standard of review to contract-based top-hat plans.
Firestone was intended to address all benefit plans, funded or not.45

B. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch. 46
The case arose when six employees of Firestone, who were rehired by Occidental
Petroleum Company (Occidental) following a sale of five Plastics Divisions plants
from Firestone to Occidental, sought severance benefits from Firestone under a termination pay plan.47

39. See Jones, supra note 32.
40. “The [select group] limitation has both quantitative and qualitative restrictions. In number, the
plan must cover relatively few employees. In character, the plan must cover only high level employees.”
Senior Exec. Benefit Plan Participants v. New Valley Corp. (In re New Valley Corp.), 89 F.3d 143, 148
(3rd Cir. 1996). As to quantity employee coverage ranges of 4-5% have generally been upheld. John
McGuiness & Kelly Geloneck, View from Groom: DOL Weighs in Again on Select Group Requirement
for Top Hat Plans, BLOOMBERG LAW: BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION VIEWS
(Sept. 8, 2015 9:00AM) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/view-from-groom-dolweighs-in-again-on-select-group-requirement-for-top-hat-plans (citations omitted). Plans with a coverage range of greater than 10% appear to be at an elevated risk of being struck down. See id.; see also
Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (b), 216 F.3d 283, 289 (2nd Cir. 2000) (observing a plan
coverage of 15.34% to be at or near the upper limit of the acceptable size for a select group); Browe v.
CTC Corp. 331 F. Supp. 3d 263, 300 (D. Vt. 2018) (noting that there is no authority among published
cases that affirms top-hat plan status for a plan that represents more than 16% of the total workforce)
(citing Guiragoss v. Khoury, 444 F.Supp.2d 649, 660 (E.D. Va. 2006)). As to quality, the select group
inquiry goes beyond a mere statistical analysis. Duggan v. Hobbs, 99 F.3d 307, 313 (9th Cir. 1996). The
employees being covered by the top-hat plan should be evaluated by factors such as their position or
compensation level and ability to affect or substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise, the
design and operation of their deferred compensation plan. Id. at 312-13 (citing DOL Opin. Letter 9014A).
41. See Lerner Galati, supra note 15, at 592.
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a).
43. See Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 443 (3rd Cir. 2001).
44. AFFINITY WEALTH ADVISORS, supra note 25.
45. See Galati, supra note 15, at 596.
46. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
47. Id. at 105.
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The termination pay plan was one of three pension and benefit plans Firestone
held for its employees at the time of the sale.48 As the sole source of funding for the
plans, Firestone had not established separate trust funds out of which to pay benefits
from the plans.49 All three of the plans were governed by ERISA, with Firestone,
by operation of law, designated as the administrator.50 At the time of the sale, however, Firestone was not aware that the termination pay plan was governed by ERISA
and therefore had not set up a claims procedure or complied with ERISA’s reporting
and disclosure obligations with respect to the plan.51
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted summary judgement for Firestone.52 The district court held that Firestone
satisfied its fiduciary duty under ERISA because its decision to not pay severance
payments under the termination plan to the plaintiffs was not arbitrary or capricious.53 On review, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court.54 While it noted that most federal courts reviewed a denial of benefits by
ERISA fiduciaries and administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
that standard had been relaxed in cases were fiduciaries or administrators possessed
some bias or adverse interest.55 The appeals court held that de novo review applied
where the employer itself was the fiduciary and administrator of an unfunded benefit plan.56 Deferential review was not warranted in such situations given the lack
of assurance of impartiality on the part of the employer.57 Firestone appealed and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue over the appropriate standard of review.58
The case posed two questions to the Court. The first concerned the appropriate
standard of judicial review of benefit determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators under ERISA.59 Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
noted the acknowledgment of the appeals court that federal courts generally review
the denial of benefits by ERISA fiduciaries and administrators under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, with exceptions for softer standards employed in cases
where the was a possibility of bias or adverse impact on the part of the fiduciaries
and administrators.60 The appeals court in Firestone held that decisions to deny benefits should be subject to de novo review in situations where the employer is itself
the fiduciary and administrator of an unfunded benefit plan.61
Justice O’Connor noted that ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law, prompting the Supreme Court to command courts to develop a
“federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.”62 In
determining the appropriate standard of review for the enforcement of civil actions
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 107-08.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 110.
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under ERISA, courts are guided by principles of trust law. 63 Trust principles allow
for a deferential standard of review when a trustee exercises discretionary powers.64
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a denial of benefits is to be reviewed
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility benefits or to construe the terms of
the plan.65

C. The Third and Seventh Circuit Cases
In the mid-nineties, Dr. Gideon Goldstein retired from Johnson & Johnson
(“J&J”), having joined the corporation in 1977.66 A physician specializing in immunobiology research, Goldstein headed J&J’s Immunobiology Research Institute.67 At the time he took charge, Goldstein entered into a new employment contract with J&J.68 During this period, the company maintained a system of two interrelated plans: an ordinary funded pension plan (Retirement Plan), which was subject
to all of ERISA’s substantive requirements, and an “Excess Benefit Plan” designed
to work in conjunction with the Retirement Plan. 69 The Excess Benefit Plan was a
type of top-hat plan, functioning by paying out the benefits due an employee under
the company pension formula that could not be paid directly from the Retirement
Plan because that plan was capped.70
Upon his retirement, Goldstein began receiving his pension under the terms of
the Retirement Plan and the Excess Benefit Plan.71 He also negotiated and signed a
severance agreement with the company.72 However, the day after he signed the
agreement, Goldstein lodged a complaint with the company pension committee,
protesting the calculation of his pension benefits.73 The issue was that the computation of his pension did not include commissions he received based on the sales of
a drug he patented, and instead was based solely on his salary and annual bonuses.74
All of the extra benefits claimed would have been paid out of the top-hat Excess
Benefit Plan.75
Goldstein brought suit and his case was tried in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey.76 The district court held against Goldstein, finding
63. Id. at 111.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 115.
66. Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 436 (3rd Cir. 2001).
67. Id. at 436-37.
68. Id. at 437.
69. Id. “The Top Hat Plan paid out the benefits due an employee under J&J’s pension formula that,
due to the cap, could not be paid directly from the Retirement Plan.”
70. Id. at 437-38. Excess benefit plans are distinct from top-hat plans, despite being a subset of such
plans. See Greg Ash, How ERISA Affects ‘Top-Hat’ Compensation Plans, BENEFITSPRO, (Sept. 18,
2018, 6:17AM), https://www.benefitspro.com/2018/09/18/how-erisa-affects-top-hat-compensationplans/. J&J styled its plan as an Excess Benefit Plan, but the Third Circuit previously determined that
the plan was actually a top-hat plan subject to ERISA. See Goldstein, 251 F.3d 433, 437 n.2 (citing
Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 178 F.3d 1279, slip op. at 10 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
71. Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 439 (3rd Cir. 2001).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (“Goldstein was then receiving a pension of $ 7,606 per month; had his commissions been
included, his pension would have been $ 30,126 per month.”).
76. Id. at 400.
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that his commissions were not “Covered Compensation” as that phrase was used in
the plan.77
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the judgment. The court cited Firestone
for the Supreme Court’s holding that plan administrators with the discretion to interpret and apply provisions subject to ERISA will be afforded an arbitrary and capricious standard of review for a judicial review of a benefits denial under the
plan.78 However, the Third Circuit held that the Excess Benefit Plan was not an
ordinary ERISA plan. As a top-hat plan, the Excess Benefit Plan was a “unique
animal” under ERISA’s provisions.79
As top-hat plans are still subject to certain ERISA procedures, such as its reporting requirements and enforcement provisions, the Department of Labor retains
supervisory authority over them.80 Because top-hat plans are meant to only compensate highly-paid executives, guidance from the DOL stated that such plans do
not require the same substantive protections necessary for other employees.81 The
Third Circuit therefore held that Firestone’s requirement of deferential review for
the discretionary decisions of administrators did not apply to top-hat plans. A judicial review of a denial of benefits under a top-hat plan was to be accorded a de novo
standard of review.82
The Seventh Circuit saw matters differently. On July 31, 2007, John W. Comrie’s tenure as an employee of IPSCO Inc., came to an end.83 An attorney, Comrie
joined IPSCO in 1980, starting at IPSCO’s corporate headquarters in Saskatchewan,
Canada.84 In 1998, IPSCO relocated its corporate headquarters to Illinois and Comrie was asked to relocate to Illinois as well.85
If Comrie were to move to the United States, Edwin Tiefenbach, then Chief
Financial Officer of IPSCO, and Alan Harris, then Director of Compensation and
Benefits for IPSCO, assured him that he would not suffer a material reduction of
the retirement benefits he would have received had he remained in Canada.86 Additionally, he would become a participant in a United States supplemental executive
retirement plan (“U.S. SERP”), a type of top-hat plan.87 Comrie made the move in
1999 and has remained in the U.S. since, becoming a citizen in 2006.88
Upon the termination of his employment, in which he was “involuntarily retired,” Comrie applied for benefits pursuant to U.S. SERP. 89 In response, he

77. Id.
78. Id. at 442 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1988)).
79. Id.
80. Top Hat Plans (Supplelmental [sic] Deferred Compensation Benefits), CAREY & ASSOCIATES
P.C., https://capclaw.com/top-hat-plans/ (last visited April 11, 2020).
81. Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 442 (citing DOL Opin. Letter 90-14 A, 1990 WL 123933, at *1 (May 8,
1990)).
82. Id. at 443.
83. Comrie v. IPSCO Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100727, at *3 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 10, 2008), aff’d, 636
F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2011).
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. at *3.
86. Id.
87. Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., 636 F.3d 839, 840 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Known colloquially as top-hat plans,
such supplemental plans are unfunded (so there is no trust account; benefits come from the employer’s
coffers).”) (citing Feinberg v. RM Acquisition, LLC, No. 10-1890, 629 F.3d 671, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
249 *1-*2 (7th Cir. Jan. 6, 2011)).
88. Comrie, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100727 at *4.
89. Id.
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received a letter from the IPSCO Benefits Committee (PBC) rejecting his claims. 90
Appealing the decision, he received another rejection from the same committee. 91
Comrie brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. The district court accorded the plan the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review, as the plan expressly conferred interpretive discretion on
the administrative committee.92 Deferring to the judgment of the committee, the
court found the decision to be reasonable, granting summary judgment for defendants.93
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit took note of the decision in Goldstein, “that
courts must make independent decisions, no matter what a plan’s governing documents say.”94 Their response was blunt: “We don’t get it.”95 In the Seventh Circuit’s
view, Firestone held that fiduciary status led to independent judicial decisions, unless otherwise specified by the contract. To hold, as Goldstein did, that non-fiduciary status requires independent decisions, would “turn Firestone on its head.”96
Firestone, to the Seventh Circuit, instructs that a contract conferring interpretive
discretion is to be respected, even when the decision is made by an ERISA fiduciary.
Applying the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, the court upheld the
ruling of the district court against Comrie. The separate mention of “bonuses” and
“incentive pay” in the plan description was a measure designed to reduce uncertainty, informing employees that the definition of compensation in the 401(k) plan
is comprehensive.97 This refuted Comrie’s argument that listing “bonuses” and “incentive pay” separately demonstrated that stock-lined income is not a bonus.98

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review
The standard of arbitrary and capricious review finds its origins in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).99 The relevant section of the United States Code
Service states that a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”100 The statutory text mentions

90. Id.
91. Id. Comrie alleges that the rejections were based on a document that he had never seen before. He
also alleged that the PBC miscalculated his years of service under the SERP, used the wrong currency
conversion, and disregarded promises made to him before he moved to the U.S.
92. Comrie, 636 F.3d 839 at 841.
93. See Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46988, at 23 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2010), aff’d,
636 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2011).
94. Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., 636 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson,
251 F.3d 433, 442-43 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 843.
98. See id.
99. Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C.L. REV. 721, 727
(2014).
100. 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2)(A).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol5/iss1/4

10

Taddeo: Form Over Function: The Case for Employing the Arbitrary and Capr

No. 1]

Taddeo: Form Over Function

11

agency decisions, but, as Goldstein and Comrie demonstrate, this standard can apply to the decisions of other entities as well.
Arbitrary and capricious review is highly deferential, resembling the rational
basis style of review employed by courts prior to the APA.101 Under such a standard,
only in rare circumstances will an adverse judgement arise; plan administrators are
free to craft and interpret policies with minimal judicial oversight. 102 The concept
“defies generalized application and must be individually tailored.”103
It is rare for a court to find that an entity has abused its discretion when employing the arbitrary and capricious standard. Nonetheless, in the context of a reviewing trustees’ decisions under ERISA, reviewing courts have identified several
general considerations in reviewing for potential abuse.104 One such consideration
is the uniformity of construction of the plan.105 A pension or benefit plan must be
uniformly construed to ensure that similarly situated participants are treated
equally.106 A second consideration is whether the plan is being interpreted contrary
to its terms.107 A fiduciary’s actions cannot be taken in direct contravention of the
plain meaning of the plan.108 There can be some difficulty here if the plan contains
ambiguous terms. In such cases, courts will usually attempt to discern the meaning
by reference to other provisions of the plan.109 Third, courts look for a fair interpretation.110 Fiduciaries may be found to be in breach of their fiduciary obligations
even when acting within their discretion and authorization by the plain language of
the plan. One such breach occurs when a fiduciary with broad discretion refuses to
exercise such discretion to avoid injustice. Another breach occurs when the fiduciary, in exercising their broad discretion, violates principles of fundamental fairness.
A fourth consideration is the existence unanticipated costs.111 Most adverse decisions rendered under this factor concerned the propriety of the denial of an award
of lump sum benefits from plans which authorize them.112
All of these considerations present instances of a strong conflict of interest.
Even under a deferential standard, there remain circumstances in which the administrator will not prevail. The arbitrary and capricious standard provides the proper
balance in weighing the actions of the administrator versus those of the claimant.
In Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, the court held that application of the de
novo standard did not materially change that outcome of the case because ordinary
contract principles applied.113 The reviewing court had the duty to give full effect
101. Virelli, supra note 99, at 727.
102. See Joshua Foster, ERISA, Trust Law, and the Appropriate Standard of Review: A De Novo Review, 82 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 735, 750 (2008).
103. John A. McCreary Jr., The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard under ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1033, 1047 (1985) (citing Maggard v. O’Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C.
Cir. 1982)).
104. Id. at 1047-48 (citing Carr v. Trustees of Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int’l. Union
Pension Fund, 585 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1984)).
105. Id. at 1047.
106. See id. at 1048.
107. Id. at 1047-48
108. Id. at 1051.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1047-48
111. Id.
112. See id. at 1054-55.
113. Sznewajs v. United States Bancorp Amended & Restated Supplemental Benefits Plan, 572 F.3d
727, 734 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 442-43 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
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to the entire pension plan, including provisions granting the administrator discretionary interpretation.114 Importing de novo language into the standard of review
simply because the plan is a top-hat plan risks creating unnecessary confusion.115
Employing the arbitrary and capricious standard provides the most efficient
way to eliminate confusion among the courts. In Firestone, the primary contention
for the de novo standard arose where the employer was both the administrator and
fiduciary of the benefit plan.116 However, this dilemma arguably does not even exist
under ERISA. According to the Fifth Circuit, it is “clear” that the definition of fiduciary under ERISA is to be broadly construed.117 The definition may take into
account factors other than particular titles, such as the authority that an individual
exercises over an employee benefits plan.118
The Fifth Circuit in Donovan v. Mercer applied this broad definition to find
that defendant, Wanda Jo Mercer, was an ERISA fiduciary.119 Wanda Jo had signed
documents which identified her as a trustee or administrator of an employee retirement plan.120 One of these documents effected the transfer of land held by the
plan.121 The court found that making the transfer constituted a clear exercise of discretionary authority in the disposition of plan assets.122 It was “apparent” in signing
those documents as an administrator that the defendant performed fiduciary duties.123
In Donovan, the defendant was found to be acting as both an administrator and
as a fiduciary simultaneously.124 Her act of signing off on the land transfer was a
fiduciary act conducted in the course of her duties as an administrator. 125 There is
arguably little to no distinction between the two roles in administering the ERISA
qualified plan to begin with.126 The fiduciary vs. administrator analysis dictated by
de novo review burdens courts with a task that is moot and a waste of time.

114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 107-08 (1989) (“The Court of Appeals
held that where an employer is itself the fiduciary and administrator of an unfunded benefit plan, its
decision to deny benefits should be subject to de novo judicial review. It reasoned that in such situations
deference is unwarranted given the lack of assurance of impartiality on the part of the employer.”) (citing
Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 137-145 (3rd Cir. Dec. 1986)).
117. See Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1984).
118. Id. (“Thus, ‘fiduciary’ should be defined not only by reference to particular titles, such as “trustee,”
but also by considering the authority which a particular person has or exercises over an employee benefit
plan.”) (citing Brink v. Dalesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350, 1374-75 (D. Md. 1980), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 667 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1982)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 309.
124. See id. at 308-09 (“We thus disagree with the district court’s conclusion that in making this transfer, Wanda Jo acted only as an agent for her husband. No evidence in the record supports such a conclusion. Rather, it is apparent that, in signing documents in transferring Plan assets, Wanda Jo performed
fiduciary duties as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21).”).
125. Id. at 308.
126. See id. at 309 (“The courts and commentators agree that certain positions, such as trustee or plan
administrator, inherently require fiduciary responsibilities.”) (citing Robbins v. First American Bank of
Virginia, 514 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Little & Traikill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA; a Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977)).
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B. De Novo Review
De novo review takes its name from the Latin expression meaning “anew” or
“from the beginning.”127 It is a non-deferential standard of review, and a court considering questions of law de novo gives no accordance to the decisions of the lower
courts which previously considered the question.128
Because de novo review considers issues of law from scratch, critics argue that
it imposes greater costs on the legal system.129 A deferential standard of review may
discourage parties from bringing lawsuits, saving the time and expense of litigation.130 This matter was considered by the Court in Firestone, where Firestone and
its amici asserted that “a de novo standard would contravene the spirit of ERISA
because it would impose much administrative and litigation costs and therefore discourage employers from creating benefit plans.”131 Justice O’Connor rejected this
contention, writing that “as to both funded and unfunded plans, the threat of increased litigation is not sufficient to outweigh the reasons for a de novo standard
that we have already explained.”132
However, there are strong policy reasons that do warrant consideration for employing a deferential standard of review. Even for cases that are brought under a
deferential standard, time and money are still saved as regulations limit discovery
in ERISA cases where a deferential standard applies.133 Furthermore, one goal of
ERISA is to encourage the private resolution of disputes.134 The lengthy and thorough review required of courts under the de novo standard subverts these stated
policies of internal resolution that ERISA promotes.135 Affording discretion to plan
administrators allows for a two-pronged reduction of the burden placed on courts.136
Courts reduce their own caseload and time constraints while simultaneously promoting ERISA’s goals of private resolution.137
Legislative intent also signals a backing of a deferential standard.138 Writing
for the majority in Firestone, Justice O’Connor noted a bill proposed in Congress
in 1981, H.R. 6226.139 The bill was introduced to amend Section 1132 of ERISA by
providing de novo review of decisions denying benefits.140 The bill was never enacted, with plaintiff Firestone maintaining that the inaction indicated Congress was
content with the arbitrary and capricious standard.141 The Court disagreed, with

127. Adam
Hayes,
De
Novo
Judicial
Review,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/de-novo-judicial-review.asp (last updated Jan. 2, 2021).
128. Id.
129. See generally Foster, supra note 102, at 751-52 (indicating that de novo review requires strict
judicial oversight).
130. Id. at 757-58.
131. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989).
132. Id. at 115.
133. Foster, supra note 102, at 757.
134. See id. at 758 (citing Grossmuller v. Local 813, Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric.
Implement Workers, 715 F.2d 853, 857 (3rd Cir. 1983)).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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O’Connor writing that the failure to act, while “instructive”, was not “conclusive”
of Congress’ views on the proper standard of review.142
It is important to note that while legislative inaction did not “carr[y] the day”
for the plaintiff, the Court did agree with the notion that it could signal Congressional support for a deferential standard of review.143 But as Justice O’Connor put
it, “[t]he bill’s demise may have been the result of events that had nothing to do
with Congress’ view on the propriety of de novo review.”144 Congress has not revisited the issue in any subsequent session.145
In closing the discussion of de novo review, it is essential to conclude with a
discussion on the structural irrelevance of the non-deferential standard as applied to
denials of benefits under top-hat plans. In 2015, the arbitrary vs. de novo debacle
reached the First Circuit in Niebauer v. Crane & Co.146 At the fork in the standard
of review road, the First Circuit ultimately decided that it need not take any road at
all.147 The court explained that applying de novo review to denials of benefits under
top-hat plans would lead it to simply undergo the same analysis as it would have
had it gone with the deferential standard in the first place.148
In cases involving top-hat plans, the path dictated by de novo review is that of
applying ordinary contract principles.149 These principles simply lead the reviewing
court to ask whether the decision by the administrator was reasonable.150 In asking
this question, the reviewing court finds itself at the very same point it would have
arrived at had it employed the deferential standard.151 The only difference is that the
court had to wade through an additional unnecessary layer of analysis to get there.
142. Id. (citing Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 837, n. 12 (1983)).
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See Foster, supra note 102, at 759.
146. 783 F.3d 914 (1st Cir. 2015).
147. Id. at 923 (“We decline to decide whether top hat plans are categorically subject to de novo review
because, as Crane observes, ‘[e]ven the Circuit courts that have reviewed top hat decisions under “ordinary contract principles”…have noted that it is a distinction without a difference where, as here, the plan
grants the administrator discretion to interpret the plan.’”). The court went on to note that the application
of de novo review in Goldstein and Craig, cases on which the plaintiff was relying, simply led the reviewing courts to examine the decisions of the plan administrators for reasonableness. See Am. Int’l
Grp., Inc. v. Guterman, 496 F. Appx. 149, 151 (2nd Cir. 2012) (declining to decide whether to apply
Firestone analysis to a top-hat plan benefits appeal as employing de novo review would reach the same
conclusion as the plan administrator). Interestingly, however, while the 2nd Circuit declined to take a
position when addressing the issue head on, in practice, it has consistently employed the arbitrary and
capricious standard. See Roganti v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 786 F.3d 201, 204 (2nd Cir. 2015) (reviewing under the abuse of discretion standard a number of plans, including a top-hat one); Panecassio
v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 108-109 (2nd Cir. 2008) (deciding a top-hat plan administrator did not abuse its discretion and was properly awarded summary judgment); Casagrande v. Siemens
AG, No. 11 CIV. 5442 RMB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83943, 2013 WL 2489933, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June
11, 2013) (granting summary judgment to the administrator of a top-hat plan).”
148. Id.
149. See id.; Plotnick v. Computer Scis. Corp. Deferred Comp. Plan, 875 F. 3d 160, 165-66 (4th Cir.
2017); Am. Int’l Grp., 496 F. Appx. at 151.
150. See Peck v. Selex Sys. Integration, 895 F.3d 813, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“It bears noting that, while
the courts expressly disagree about the governing standard, e.g., Comrie, 636 F.3d at 842, the extent to
which the competing approaches result in a practical difference may be open to some question: even the
courts to reject Firestone’s deferential standard still ultimately ask “whether the Plan’s decision was
reasonable.”)
151. Plotnick, 875 F. 3d. at 166 (“[U]nder either an abuse-of-discretion or a contract-based standard, a
‘reasonable’ exercise of discretion would stand, essentially closing any rhetorical distance between the
two competing standards of review.”)
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The concept at the core of de novo review, of according no deference to the lower
courts, ultimately results in giving the same deference to plan administrators that
they would have received under the arbitrary and capricious standard.152

IV. ADDRESSING TOP-HAT PLAN ADMINISTRATORS
A. The Irrelevance of Fiduciary Status
The Firestone Court found it evident that ERISA’s legislative history mandates
the applicability of trust law to the Act’s fiduciary responsibility provisions.153 The
application of the trust law standard leads to leads to a jurisprudence where independent judicial decision making is the norm, and deference to the plan administrator is the exception.154
In Comrie, the plaintiff asked the court to disregard the language of the retirement plan that conferred interpretive discretion on the administrative committee.155
Aside from arguing that members of the committee possessed a conflict of interest,
he also argued that the administrator of a top-hat plan is not an ERISA fiduciary.156
However, under Firestone, the Supreme Court instructed that contracts conferring
interpretive discretion must be respected, even when the decision is made by an
ERISA fiduciary.157 It is easier, not harder, to honor discretion-conferring clauses
in contracts that govern the actions of non-fiduciaries.158 Both Goldstein and Craig
failed to identify any federal law that these clauses violate. 159 When ERISA fails to
specify a rule of decision, contracts govern, especially so when no fiduciary duty is
called for.160
In Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., the Seventh Circuit applied deferential review
to a decision under a top-hat plan that provided its administrator with interpretive
discretion.161 In Olander, the plaintiff brought suit against his former employer for
152. Niebauer v. Crane & Co., 783 F.3d 914, 923 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Both the Third and Eighth Circuit
cases upon which Niebauer relies ultimately reviewed decisions under top hat plans simply for reasonableness.”) (citing Craig v. Pillsbury Non-Qualified Pension Plan, 458 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2006);
Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 444 (3rd Cir. 2001)). See also Holloman v. Mail-Well
Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that when “the questions in [a] case turn on interpretation of what the plain terms of the plans permit and require, the results would be precisely the same under
either standard of review.”).
153. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110.
154. Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., 636 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Krolnik v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 570 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Firestone holds that ‘de novo review’ is the norm in litigation
under ERISA.”). Interestingly, Krolnik court argues that the phrase de novo is misleading, for Firestone
does not require an independent review, but rather an independent decision. An independent decision is
more in accord with the principles of contract litigation, which is how the Court in Firestone held that
EIRSA benefit claim litigation be conducted. Krolnik, 570 F.3d at 843 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at
112-13). Notwithstanding the merits of this contention, this paper has, and will continue to, employ the
term “de novo review.”
155. Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., 636 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 842.
158. Id.
159. Id. (“What rule of federal law do [discretion-conferring] clauses violate? Neither Craig nor Goldstein identified one.”).
160. See Plotnick v. Computer Scis. Corp. Deferred Comp. Plan, 875 F. 3d 160, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2017);
Am. Int’l Grp., 496 F. Appx. at 151.
161. 187 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1999).
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certain benefits under a supplementary pension benefit plan (“Supp Plan”) which
he had drafted for the employer as its chief legal officer.162 The central issue was
whether the payments received by Olander were compensation for purposes of calculating plan benefits.163
The defendant, Bucyrus-Erie Company, argued that the plan at issue was a type
of top-hat plan, subject to ERISA’s enforcement provisions even if it was excepted
from ERISA’s vesting, participation, funding, and fiduciary rules. 164 The plaintiff,
Olander, in turn contended that the Supp Plan was an excess benefit plan, completely exempt from ERISA.165
The court concurred with the magistrate judge that the Supp Plan was governed
by ERISA.166 Under Supreme Court precedent, judicial review of benefit eligibility
determinations under an ERISA plan vary with the fiduciary’s power to construe
terms of the plan.167 In particular, when a fiduciary has such discretion, review is
deferential, and the interpretation of the fiduciary is overturned only if it constitutes
an abuse of discretion.168 Reading the language of the plan “in an ordinary sense as
would a person of average intelligence and experience,” the court found that the
fiduciary had such discretion.169 According the fiduciary a high degree of deference,
the court found that the majority of contested payments did not constitute an abuse
of discretion.170
In formulating their ruling, the Seventh Circuit developed a useful statutory
test. The test “turn[s]” on the purposes of the plan in general rather than on the
specific way the plan applies to a party.171 In Olander, this meant that even though
the plan had the sole effect of avoiding Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code,
the fact that it had multiple purposes still rendered it a top-hat plan rather than the
entirely ERISA exempt excess benefit plan.172
The emphasis on purpose over effect, preferring form over function, demonstrates the irrelevance of fiduciary status and lends support for the use of a deferential standard. Olander’s plan was a top-hat plan exempt from ERISA’s fiduciary
162. Id. at 602.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 604. If the plan was a top-hat plan, ERISA would preempt state law. Under ERISA, the
fiduciary’s discretion to interpret the plan and determine benefit plan eligibility would be accorded “great
deference and [the fiduciary’s] determinations will be sustained if reasonable.” Firestone, 489 U.S. at
110. In this scenario, the odds would favor Bucyrus.
165. Id. Excess Benefit Plan is defined in statute. 29 USCS § 1002(36) (2019) (“The term ‘excess
benefit plan’ means a plan maintained by an employer solely for the purpose of providing benefits for
certain employees in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits imposed by Section 415 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 415] on plans to which that section applies, without
regard to whether the plan is funded. To the extent that a separable part of a plan (as determined by the
Secretary of Labor) maintained by an employer is maintained for such purpose, that part shall be treated
as a separate plan which is an excess benefit plan.”) If the retirement plan were an unfunded excess
benefit plan, ERISA would not preempt and the plan would be subject to Wisconsin contract law. Under
Wisconsin law, the plan would be subject to de novo review, the more favorable standard for Olander.
166. Olander, 187 F.3d at 604.
167. Id. at 606-07 (citing Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d, 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 607.
170. Id. (finding that four out of the five contested payments did not constitute an abuse of discretion).
171. Id.
172. Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 187 F.3d 599, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Even if a plan with other purposes has only the effect of avoiding the § 415 limitations in an individual’s case, that does not mean
that avoiding those limitations was the sole purpose for which the employer maintained the plan, which
is the decisive consideration here.”) (emphasis added).
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rules.173 However, the Seventh Circuit held that it was ultimately the plan’s content
itself that afforded it the arbitrary and capricious standard.174 Even without fiduciary
authority, contractual principles mandate a plain reading of the plan. Both Goldstein
and Craig failed to cite law to the contrary, and when no federal statute is on point,
contracts govern.175 The lack of fiduciary status does not mandate, or even encourage, de novo review.176

B. The Application of Contract Principles
Notably, in both the Goldstein and Craig decisions, the courts emphasized that
the application of the de novo standard did not result in a material change in the
outcome of the case.177 Even when top-hat plans are reviewed under the non-deferential standard, ordinary contract principles apply.178 The reviewing court must
grant full effect to all provisions in the plan, including those which grant the administrator discretionary interpretation.179
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, actions challenging an employer’s denial of
benefits were reviewed according to principles of contract law.180 Where the plan
failed to give the administrator discretionary authority to interpret ambiguous terms,
the court reviewed the employee’s claim by looking to the terms of the plan and
other manifestations of the parties’ intent.181
Where a party is granted discretion under the terms of a contract, that discretion
must be exercised in good faith—”a requirement that includes the duty to exercise
the discretion reasonably.”182 Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
defines the good faith performance or enforcement of a contract as “emphasiz[ing]
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.”183 Good faith execution puts forth a lenient standard,
finding contracts “enforceable even when particular parties are able to specify terms
in the course of dealing.”184

173. Galati, supra note 15, at 609 (citing Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 187 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir.
1999)).
174. In Garratt v. Knowles, 245 F.3d, 941, 947 (7th Cir. Mar. 28, 2001), the Seventh Circuit revisited
Olander. In particular, the Court took note of how, despite Olander’s claims “that the plan applied to his
particular case in a manner such that the purpose of the plan was only to avoid § 415, [ the Court] determined that the stated purpose, which was broader, could not be ignored.” See more on Olander in Section
IV infra.
175. Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., 636 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432, 119 S. Ct. 755, 142 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1999)).
176. See id.
177. Sznewajs v. United States Bancorp Amended & Restated Supplemental Benefits Plan, 572 F.3d
727 (9th Cir. 2008).
178. See id.; Jones, supra note 32. Jones advises that top-hat plans are best drafted to grant the plan
administrator full discretion to issue binding determinations. Even in spite of the circuit split, a court
may decide to enforce plan provisions as a matter of contract law.
179. Szenwajs, 572 F.3d at 734.
180. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989).
181. Id.
182. Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 444 (3rd Cir. 2001) (citing Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 205).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
184. Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 444 (citing O.N. Jonas Co., Inc. v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d 1161 (11th
Cir. 1983) (interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code)).
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The Third Circuit cited the aforementioned statement in its ruling against Goldstein.185 Even under de novo review, the court found “nothing improper” in the plan
contract that gave J&J the responsibility to administer the plan and interpret ambiguous terms.186 An analogous situation played out in Craig, with the Eighth Circuit
noting that de novo review, while proper, would not change the nature of the court’s
analysis.187 Drawing on Goldstein five years prior, the Eighth Circuit applied ordinary contract principles in reviewing the plan as a unilateral contract. 188 In both
cases, the ultimate question was the same: Is the plan reasonable?189 Goldstein concluded that it was and Craig concluded that it was not.190 However, the end result
was still the same result that would have occurred had the courts adhered to the
deferential framework established by Firestone. Goldstein and Craig simply added
another level of complexity, setting a poor example that could prolong future litigation unnecessarily.
The issue over competing standards of review between top-hat plans and
ERISA plans arises when the plan at issue explicitly grants discretion to plan administrators. A plan administrator need not exercise their entire discretionary authority and control to be classified as a fiduciary.191 Rather, an administrator becomes a fiduciary to the extent they exercise any such authority or control.192
Top-hat plans, by their nature, mandate some degree of fiduciary authority and
control to their administrators. In Olander, the Seventh Circuit held that even a partial grant of control over an aspect of the plan accorded fiduciary deference to the
plan committee.193 Reading the plan under the perspective of a person of average
intelligence, the plain meaning is controlling, and the Committee had discretion
over any ambiguous gaps.194 That same plain meaning does not change when reviewing the plan under ordinary contract principles.195

V. PROBLEMS WITH NON-DEFERENTIAL REVIEW
As seen in Goldstein, top-hat plans are related to excess benefit plans. 196 However, despite being a subset of top-hat plans, excess benefit plans are a distinct type
of plan with key differences.197 The lack of a deferential standard exacerbates the
185. Id.
186. Id. The court found further strength for the plan in its design to work together with a retirement
plan that had designated the same entity as the beneficiary (“a perfectly legitimate design”). Id.
187. Craig v. Pillsbury Non-Qualified Pension Plan, 458 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The fact that
we conduct a de novo review does not, however, alter our analysis as much as it might appear at first
blush.”).
188. Id. (citing Goldstein 251 F.3d at 444).
189. Craig, 458 F.3d a 753; Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 444.
190. Craig, 458 F.3d at 753; Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 448.
191. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989).
192. Id.
193. Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 187 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1999). Olander argued that the term
“distribute” referred only to discretion over distribution and not discretion over calculation of benefits.
The court found this argument unpersuasive. Olander did not elaborate on why the term meant discretion
over distribution only and why the plain meaning would extend to calculation.
194. See id. (“[T]he Committee had discretion with regard to the terms and conditions of the distribution, including what payments to plan participants count as compensation for the purposes of calculating
plan benefits.”)
195. Id.
196. Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 444 (3rd Cir. 2001).
197. See JAMES O. BAKER ET. AL., JONES DAY, ERISA, 27-8 (2007).
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harms of getting these two types of plans mixed up, an issue that is lessened when
deference is exercised.

A. Top-Hat Plans vs. Excess Benefit Plans
Top-hat plans are not entirely exempt from ERISA, and remain subject to certain provisions.198 However, excess benefit plans, defined in 29 U.S.C. 1002(36),199
are completely shielded from ERISA’s reach.200
Participation in an excess benefit plan is not limited to a select group of management or highly-compensated employees.201 Perhaps most importantly, such
plans must be established for the sole purpose of avoiding the benefit and contribution limits set forth in Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code. 202 At the time of
ERISA’s enactment, Section 415 comprised the only significant limitation on qualified retirement plan benefits.203 However, Section 401(a)(17) was subsequently enacted. This section placed an equal, if not stronger, cap on the amount of contributions that can be made to a participant’s account under a defined contribution plan
or benefits payable to a participant in a defined benefit plan.204 Nonqualified retirement plans created after the enactment of Section 401 tend to have been designed
in such a way as to compensate for the lost benefits they would have possessed but
for Sections 401 and 415.205 Falling afoul of the Section 415 sole purpose requirement, such retirement plans do not qualify under ERISA as fully exempt excess
benefit plans.206

198. See FULCRUM PARTNERS, supra note 30. Top-hat plans are exempt from most of the substantive
ERISA requirements, such as those pertaining to funding, minimum participation, and minimum vesting.
Top-hat plans remain subject to other ERISA requirements, such as those relating to claims procedures
and preemption of state law. Id.
199. 29 USCS § 1002(36) (2019) (“The term ‘excess benefit plan’ means a plan maintained by an
employer solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain employees in excess of the limitations
on contributions and benefits imposed by Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS
§ 415] on plans to which that section applies, without regard to whether the plan is funded. To the extent
that a separable part of a plan (as determined by the Secretary of Labor) maintained by an employer is
maintained for such purpose, that part shall be treated as a separate plan which is an excess benefit plan.”)
200. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5) (“The provisions of this title shall not apply to any employee benefit plan
if such plan is an excess benefit plan (as defined in section 3(36) [29 USCS § 1002(36)]) and is unfunded.”)
201. Excess Benefit Plans, HENSSLER FINANCIAL: BLOG (Aug. 2, 2019) https://www.henssler.com/excess-benefit-plans/#:~:text=An%20excess%20benefit%20plan%20is,Code%20(IRC)%20Section%20415. See also Baker, supra note 197 (“[E]xcess benefit plan participation is open to any employee whose qualified retirement plan benefits
are limited by Internal Revenue Code § 415.”).
202. Hutchison v. Crane Plastics Mfg., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43628, at *8 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (“The
difference between a top hat plan and an excess benefit plan is that top hat plans can have multiple broad
purposes, while an excess benefit plan has the sole purpose of avoiding the limitations imposed by §
415.”) (citing Garratt v. Knowles, 245 F.3d 941, 946 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001)).
203. See Ash, supra note 70.
204. See id.; I.R.C. 401(a)(17) (setting a compensation limit of $200,000 for the annual compensation
of each employee that may be taken into account under a trust plan that is qualified under Section 410).
205. See Ash, supra note 70.
206. See id.
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B. Excess Benefit Plans Cause Excess Confusion
The effects of Sections 401 and 415 on excess benefit plans and their similarity
to top-hat plans have led litigating parties to confuse the two.
Hutchison v. Crane featured the issue of determining whether a retirement plan
was a top-hat or excess benefit plan. 207 As part of an action filed against his former
employer, Herbert, L. Hutchison asserted a breach of contract action. 208 Hutchison
argued that the plan was an excess benefit plan and exempt from ERISA. Crane in
turn argued that Hutchison’s retirement plan was a top-hat plan and thus preempted
by ERISA.209
The resolution of the issue over the identity of the plan required the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to engage in a lengthy and
complex analysis. Determining whether the plan qualified as an excess benefit plan
required consideration of the plain language of the plan, but also consideration of
the “surrounding circumstances.”210 The Hutchison court was confronted by the dilemma of form vs. function.211 That is, if a plan has the sole effect (function) of
avoiding the Section 415 limits, may it be classified as an excess benefit plan if the
plan does not specifically list Section 415 avoidance as its sole purpose (form)? 212
The court’s analysis ultimately led it to revisit Olander from the Seventh Circuit. In the face of the parties’ conflicting information as to whether Hutchison’s
contributions exceeded the Section 415 limitations, the court’s application of
Olander allowed for a swift and simple resolution to the issue.213 The plan contained
no reference to Section 415, the only stated purpose being “to enhance the career
remuneration of [the corporation’s] key management and highly compensated employees.”214 Noting that the plan did not list Section 415 avoidance as it is sole
purpose, the court ruled against Hutchison on his breach of contract claim.215
Olander’s statutory test of deferring to the language of the plan in light of conflicting interpretations saved the Seventh Circuit a great deal of headache. 216 Applying
207. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43628 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
208. Id. at *7. Hutchison asserted a breach of contract claim for Crane’s failure to pay him appreciation
on his deferred compensation account and to pay him a prorated bonus. Id.
209. Id. at *12 (“Because ERISA completely preempts state law claims that fall within the civil enforcement provision of ERISA, [Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.] Taylor, 481 U.S. [58] at 66, actions involving benefits payable from top hat plans are preempted by ERISA.”)
210. Id. at *12. (“Whether a plan meets the requirements for the “excess benefit plan” exemption may
be determined through an examination of the surrounding circumstances and an analysis of the stated
purpose of the plan as determined by its plain language.” (citing Isko v. Engelhard Corp., 367 F.2d 702,
710 (D.N.J. 2005)); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 848 F. Supp. 1515, 1519
(N.D. Ala. 1994)).
211. See generally id. at *13-*15 (examining conflicts on interpreting the plain language of the plans,
particularly whether the plan needed Section 415 avoidance as a sole reason and whether reference to
substantive provisions is also necessary.)
212. Id.
213. Id. at *18. Applying Olander, the court looked past the parties’ differing interpretations and examined the purposes of the plan directly. Id. (“The fact that a plan with other purposes has the effect of
avoiding the § 415 limitations in a particular employee’s case does not mean that avoiding those limitations was the sole purpose for which the employer maintained the plan, and thus the plan is not an ‘excess
benefit plan.’”) (Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 187 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1999); Garratt v. Knowles,
245 F.3d, 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2001)).
214. Id. at 17-18.
215. Id. at 21-22.
216. See, e.g., id. at 18 (“The parties offer conflicting information as to whether plaintiff’s contributions
to the Plan exceeded the otherwise applicable § 415 limits. However, as previously indicated, the test
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such deference in Hutchison allowed the Southern District of Ohio to get rid of
theirs.217

VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decided Firestone with the intent of protecting the discretionary authority of ERISA plan administrators. The Seventh Circuit in Comrie
properly expanded on this intent in extending the protection of deferential review
to top-hat plan administrators.
Acts of discretionary authority are so intertwined with the administration of
plans that administrators often find themselves acting as fiduciaries, regardless of
whether they are officially accorded fiduciary status or not. It makes sense that the
Fifth Circuit in Donovan decided to broadly interpret the definition of fiduciary
under ERISA.218 It does not make sense to refuse conferring the benefit of deference
upon these administrators simply because of their designation.
Even without fiduciary status, any argument for the application of de novo review is defeated by the nature of de novo review itself. Courts reviewing top-hat
plan denials of benefits de novo rely on contract principles to guide their review. In
so doing, the courts simply need to find whether the decision of the plan administrator was reasonable, a highly deferential task that ultimately takes them along the
same path as if they were applying deferential review.
De novo review brings along a myriad of unnecessary steps and questions for
the reviewing court to handle when reviewing an issue from the ground up, issues
that are easily bypassed through deferential review. Employing the deferential
standard stays loyal to ERISA, to Firestone, and to the principles of our Nation’s
judicial system to ensure timely and efficient resolution of cases. Form takes precedence over function.

for whether a plan is an excess benefit plan turns on the purposes of the plan in general rather than on
the specific way the plan applies to a party (citing Olander, 187 F.3d at 604).
217. See id. Additionally, cutting through a related issue, the Court also made it a point to demonstrate
that any labels an employer may place on a plan are not determinative in classifying whether the plan is
subject to ERISA or not. Id. at 19-20 (citing Stern v. IBM, 326 F.3d 1367, 1374 (11th Cir. 2003) (“employer’s mere labeling of the plan as and ERISA plan does not determine whether ERISA applies”);
Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 437 n. 2 (3rd Cir. 2001).
(“noting that in a previous appeal, the court decided that plan was a top hat plan despite fact that plan
was styled as an ‘Excess Benefit Plan’”); Miller v. PPG Industries, Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 826, 831 (W.D.
Ky. 2003) (“fact that employer described plan as ERISA plan not determinative”). While not specifically
cited, the fact that the Court undertook a form over function analysis, looking past the superficial aspects
of the plan to see what it was actually intended to accomplish, can’t help but make one wonder if this
argument was put forth in the spirit of Olander.
218. See Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1984), previously addressed in Section III(A).
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